CSCE 689: Special Topics in Modern Algorithms for Data Science

Lecture 32

Samson Zhou

Presentation Schedule

- November 27: Chunkai, Jung, Galaxy AI
- November 29: STMI, Anmol, Jason
- December 1: Bokun, Ayesha, Dawei, Lipai

census.gov:

Privacy & Confidentiality

Federal Law Protects Your Information. The U.S. Census Bureau is bound by Title 13 of the United States Code. This law not only provides authority for the work we do, but also provides strong protection for the information we collect from individuals and businesses. As a result, the Census Bureau has one of the strongest confidentiality guarantees in the federal government.

It is against the law for any Census Bureau employee to disclose or publish any census or survey information that identifies an individual or business. This is true even for inter-agency communication: the FBI and other government entities do not have the legal right to access this information. In fact, when these protections have been challenged, Title 13's confidentiality guarantee has been upheld.

For more information about how the Census Bureau safeguards the data it collects, visit the agency's Data Protection and Disclosure Avoidance Working Papers Web sites.

Private Data Analysis

Sensitive dataset



Analyst

- Analysis of medical datasets to predict possible issues
- Pattern detection for social networks or epidemic spread
- US Census information for apportionment

Anonymization

Sensitive dataset



Anonymized
dataset

Analyst

Anonymizing Data

Age	Zip Code	Employer	Has Pet
56	77005	Apple	Yes
32	77005	Microsoft	No
71	77005	Amazon	Yes
44	77005	Petsmart	Yes
25	77005	Netflix	No
61	77005	Google	No

Anonymizing Data

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56	77005	Apple	Yes
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Name	Age	Gender	Employer
Alice	56	Female	Apple
Bob	32	Male	Microsoft
Carol	71	Female	Amazon
Dale	44	Male	Petsmart
Erin	25	Female	Netflix
Fred	61	Male	Google

Reconstruction Attack

Name	Age	Zip Code	Gender	Employer	Has Pet
Alice	56	77005	Female	Apple	Yes
Bob	32	77005	Male	Microsoft	No
Carol	71	77005	Female	Amazon	Yes
Dale	44	77005	Male	Petsmart	Yes
Erin	25	77005	Female	Netflix	No
Fred	61	77005	Male	Google	No

Anonymizing Data

The New York Times

Netflix Cancels Contest After Concerns Are Raised About Privacy

Share full article

By Steve Lohr

March 12, 2010



Image from Arvind Narayanan

Differencing Attacks

- How many people in this classroom went to Kyle Field last weekend?

- How many people in this classroom besides the instructor went to Kyle Field last weekend?

US Census Bureau

Slide from Steven Wu



2010 US Census

- $308{,}745{,}738$ people $\times$ 6 variables = $1{,}852{,}473{,}228$ measurements collected

- Total statistics: $5{,}578{,}897{,}932$

- Create a system of 5.5 billion equations with 1.8 billion unknowns

2010 US Census

- Reconstruction attack on 2010 US Census by researchers recovered information for 308,745,538 people using census block and tract summary tables



Summary

- “Ad-hoc” privacy procedures like anonymization/deidentification often fails

- Publishing too many queries on a sensitive database with too much accuracy can compromise the privacy of the database

- Need a formal mathematical notion for measuring privacy

Possible Notion for Privacy #1

- “The data analyst cannot learn anything about Alice”

Sensitive dataset

Analyst

Possible Notion for Privacy #1

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

Alice is known to be an Aggie

Sensitive dataset

Analyst

Was Alice’s privacy violated?

Possible Notion for Privacy #1

- "The data analyst cannot learn anything about Alice"



Bob participates in the survey

Sensitive dataset

Analyst

Even though Alice is not in the survey, it is still known that Alice is an Aggie

Possible Notion for Privacy #1

- Suppose a survey is conducted on a sensitive dataset and concludes that *"most Aggies like dogs, e.g., Reveille"*

- Alice is a known Aggie, and so a data analyst infers that Alice is more likely to be a dog owner and asks for higher apartment cleaning rates

- Was Alice's privacy violated by this study?

Possible Notion for Privacy #2

- “A study is private…if the data analyst gains *almost no additional information* about Alice from the study than if the same study was performed *without Alice’s data*”



Possible Notion for Privacy #2

- Stability: the data analyst reaches roughly similar conclusions if any individual data point is replaced by another data point of the population



Differential Privacy

- [DMNS06] Given $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0,1)$, a randomized algorithm $A: U^* \to Y$ is (ε, δ)-differentially private if, for every neighboring frequency vectors f and f' and for all $E \subseteq Y$,

$$\Pr[A(f) \in E] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \cdot \Pr[A(f') \in E] + \delta$$

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$A($  $) \approx A($  $)$

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- For small ε, can think of e^{ε} as $1 + \varepsilon$

$$\Pr[A(f) \in E] \leq (1 + \varepsilon) \cdot \Pr[A(f') \in E] + \delta$$

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- δ can be interpreted as the probability that the mechanism "fails" to be differentially private

Differential Privacy

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$$\Pr[A(f) \in E] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \cdot \Pr[A(f') \in E] + \delta$$
- If $\delta = 0$, a mechanism is said to satisfy *pure differential privacy*
- Otherwise if $\delta > 0$, a mechanism is said to satisfy *approximate differential privacy*

Differential Privacy

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

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- Implication: Deterministic algorithms cannot be differentially private unless they are a constant function